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Abstract  
Among many personality traits, impulsivity represents one of the most important traits 
associated with pathological gambling. Empirical research has highlighted the 
multidimensional nature of impulsivity, which includes different heterogeneous traits 
and behavioral tendencies. The present study experimentally examined reward 
preferences of pathological gamblers under conditions of uncertainty using the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task. Furthermore it also examined the relationship between 
impulsivity, time perspective, inability to tolerate delay in gratification, and risk-
taking. The present study is the first to simultaneously examine all these variables 
simultaneously in a sample of pathological gamblers (n=54) and healthy controls 
(n=54) from Italy. All participants participated in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
(BART) and were also administered Italian versions of the South Oaks Gambling 
Screen, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, the Consideration of Future Consequences, 
and the Monetary Choice Questionnaire. Analyses revealed that compared to HCs, 
PGs were more risk prone on the BART, and reported elevated levels of impulsivity, 
steeper discounting rates and a shorter time perspective. All the measures correlated 
with the gambling severity and strong correlations between the BIS, CFC-14 and 
BART were observed. Logistic regression analysis demonstrated that impulsivity and 
risk-taking were strong predictors of pathological gambling. 
 
Keywords: pathological gambling, risk-taking, impulsivity, time perspective, delay 
discounting.  
  
Introduction 
Gambling is a form of socially accepted entertainment that for a small 
percentage of the population represents a serious problem of mental health 
that can negatively impact on the quality of life for people that experience it 
(Kessler, Hwang, LaBrie, Petukhova, Sampson, Winters, & Shaffer, 2008; 
Lorains, Cowlishaw, & Thomas, 2011), leading to detrimental consequences 
such as job loss, bankruptcy, suicide, divorce, impaired relationships, and 
other health-problems (Lesieur & Rosenthal, 1991; Griffiths, 2004). The 
degree of involvement in gambling lies on a continuum including 
problematic through to pathological, based on the number of symptoms that 
satisfy DSM criteria. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to find comorbidity 
between gambling and other potentially addictive behaviors such as 
smoking cigarettes, drinking alcohol, and illicit drug use (e.g., Griffiths, 
Wardle, Orford, Sproston, & Erens, 2010; Ramirez, McCormick, Russo, & 
Taber, 1983). 
Recently, the large body of research has led to a change in the diagnostic 
classification of gambling (Potenza, 2006), from an impulse control disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1980) to a behavioral addiction 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Gambling disorder has become a 
psychopathological condition of dependence different to others in that it 
does not involve the ingestion of a psychoactive substance that cause 
harmful effects in the brain (Bechara, 2003; Potenza, 2001). This 
reclassification is due to the many characteristics that gambling shares with 
substance abuse (Griffiths, 2005). Both gambling and substance abuse 
disorders show manifestations of craving (Tavares, Zilberman, Hodgins, & 
El‐Guebaly, 2005), withdrawal (Griffiths & Smeaton, 2002; Wray & 
Dickerson, 1981) and tolerance (Griffiths, 1993), and an etiological core 
that includes genetic vulnerability (Slutske, Eisen, True, Lyons, Goldberg, 
& Tsuang, 2000), and personality traits that predict the development of both 
the disorders (Vitaro, Arseneault, & Tremblay 1999; Slutske, Caspi, Moffitt, 
& Poulton, 2005). 
Among many personality traits, impulsivity represents one of the most 
important traits associated with problem gambling (Alessi & Petry, 2003; 
Cyders & Smith, 2008; MacKillop, Anderson, Castelda, Mattson, & 
Donovick, 2006a). The previous diagnostic classification of problem 
gambling as an Impulse Control Disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980) was arguably well founded as many studies have 
demonstrated the role of impulsivity in gambling and numerous studies have 
revealed significant differences in impulsivity between individuals with 
problem gambling compared to control groups (e.g., Canale, Vieno, 
Griffiths, Rubaltelli, & Santinello, 2015; MacKillop, Anderson, Castelda, 
Mattson, & Donovick, 2006b; Michalczuk, Bowden-Jones, Verdejo-Garcia, 
& Clark, 2011). 
A large body of research has brought to light the multidimensional nature of 
impulsivity, which includes different heterogeneous traits and behavioral 
tendencies (Canale et al., 2015; Flory, Harvey, Mitropoulou, New, 
Silverman, Siever, & Manuck, 2006; Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de 
Wit, 2006; Swann, Bjork, Moeller, & Dougherty, 2002; Whiteside & 
Lynam, 2003). This paper focuses on facets of impulsivity that specifically 
relate to monetary choices, and which are particularly relevant to gambling 
addiction, given the nature of the disorder, in regards to risk-taking and 
delay discounting. 
Delay discounting is the process of devaluing outcomes that require waiting 
(see Green & Myerson [2004] for a review), and refers to the propensity to 
discount steeper conspicuous delayed rewards in favor of smaller immediate 
ones (Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Rachlin & Green, 1972). In the field of 
gambling, there is a considerable evidence that problem gamblers discount 
delayed money at higher rates than non-problem gamblers or non-gamblers 
(e.g., Alessi & Petry, 2003; Brevers et al., 2012; Kräplin et al., 2014; Miedl, 
Peters, & Büchel, 2012; Petry & Casarella, 1999; Petry, 2012). Previous 
studies indicated that risk proneness is associated with problem gambling: 
gamblers tend to be more risk prone than non-gamblers and the level of 
monetary risk-taking appears to be exacerbated by continued exposure to 
gambling activities (Ladouceur, Mayrand, & Tourigny, 1987; see also 
Martins, Tavares, da Silva Lobo, Galetti, & Gentil, 2004; Petry, 2001b).  
The choice of gamble is a risk-taking behavior, based on the consideration 
of the immediate benefits that stem from the game, without considering the 
consequences that it may cause in the long-term, such as job loss, 
relationship and family problems or bankruptcy. Risk taking and delay 
discounting appear to be associated with the tendency to ignore the future 
consequences of actual behavior (Whiteside, Lynam, Miller, & Reynolds, 
2005). Strathman and colleagues defined the consideration of future 
consequences as “the extent to which people consider the potential distant 
outcomes of their current behaviors and the extent to which they are 
influenced by these potential outcomes” (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & 
Edwards, 1994; p. 743).  
Despite data in support of the higher level of impulsiveness (see MacKillop 
et al. [2014] for a review) and the inability to tolerate delay in gambling, 
few studies have tested individuals with a diagnosis of gambling disorder 
according to DSM criteria (see Wiehler & Peters, [2015] for a review) and 
the main limitation of these studies has been the use of small samples (e.g., 
Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 2003, Dixon, Jacobs, & Sanders, 2006; Miedl, 
Peters, & Büchel, 2012; Miedl, Büchel, & Peters, 2014; Kraplin et al., 
2014). Likewise, few studies have dealt with the time perspective (Hodgins 
& Engel, 2002) and with the propensity of gamblers to take risks 
(Ladouceur, Mayrand, & Tourigny, 1987). In addition, no study has ever 
examined risk proneness in individuals with a diagnosis of problem 
gambling with a behavioural measure such as the Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task that simulates real-world risky situations in which excessive risk 
increases the amount of reward that may be won but where greater risk 
results in a higher likelihood of loss.  
In addition, some issues remain unanswered. Although several authors 
consider delay discounting as a behavioral feature of impulsivity (e.g., 
Ainslie, 1975; de Wit, 2009), the literature has not clarified the nature of this 
relationship. Some studies have observed an association between the two 
constructs (e.g., Alessi & Petry, 2003; Andrade & Petry, 2012; Kräplin et 
al., 2014; Petry, 2001a, 2012), whereas other studies have not confirmed 
this pattern of results (e.g., Madden, Petry, & Johnson, 2009; Wilde, 
Goudriaan, Sabbe, Hulstijn, & Dom, 2013).  
Further, albeit the association between impulsivity and time perspective has 
been observed in adolescents (Cosenza & Nigro, 2015) and adult problem 
gamblers (MacLaren, Fugelsang, Harrigan, & Dixon, 2012; Toplak, Liu, 
MacPherson, Toneatto, & Stanovich, 2007), no study has ever examined 
this relationship in a sample of pathological gamblers.  
Moreover, there is no agreement about the association between the inability 
to tolerate delay in gratification and addiction severity (Alessi & Petry, 
2003; Brevers et al., 2012; Kräplin et al., 2014; Madden et al., 2009; Miedl 
et al., 2012; Petry, 2001a, 2012). 
Given these premises, the purpose of this study was to investigate, for the 
first time, all together, the role of impulsivity, time perspective, delay 
discounting, and risk-taking in a sample of pathological gamblers and 
healthy controls.  
It was hypothesized that pathological gamblers, compared to non-
pathological gamblers, would be more risk prone using the Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task. It was also hypothesized that, compared to healthy 
controls, pathological gamblers would be more impulsive, more oriented to 
the present, and report a steeper delay discounting. It was further 
hypothesized that there would be high correlations between these different 
features of impulsivity and pathological gambling.  
 
Method 
Participants 
The sample comprised 108 Italian male volunteers with an age range of 24-
65 years (mean= 41.56 years; SD= 10.94). Of these, 54 were pathological 
gamblers (PGs) recruited from the Local Health Trust (in the Italian cities of 
Caserta, Salerno and Naples). None of the participants had comorbid Axis-I 
or II disorders, alcohol or substance abuse, neurological or medical 
illnesses, or were undergoing any pharmacological treatment. It should also 
be noted that the pathological gamblers were recruited from the Local 
Health Trust and were diagnosed using the DSM-5 criteria (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Gamblers who met the criteria for 
pathological gambling (i.e., endorsing 5 or more out of the 9 criteria) were 
eligible for participation in the study. These were matched with 54 healthy 
controls (HCs) recruited from the local community. The controls were 
selected randomly from a large sample of adults without pre-existing 
psychiatric/neurological disorder or problem gambling. There were no 
significant differences in mean age (t106= -.48, p=0.63) or years of education 
(t106=1.59, p=0.12) between the two groups. 
 
Measures 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez, Read, Kahler, Richards, 
Ramsey, Stuart, & Brown, 2002). The BART is a computerized measure of 
risky behavior that assesses reward preferences under conditions of 
uncertainty. It comprises a series of balloons that participant has to inflate 
by clicking a button on the screen. Each click inflates the balloon and 
accrues 5 cents in a temporary bank. The more the participant inflates the 
balloon, the more money accrues. After a certain unpredictable number of 
pumps, the balloon may burst causing the money accrued in the temporary 
bank to be lost. It is possible at any time for a participant to click on the 
button labeled “Collect $$$”, which transfers all money from the temporary 
bank to the permanent bank, where the money can no longer be lost, even if 
the next balloon bursts. The bursting of the balloon causes the loss of money 
in the temporary bank, while money in the permanent bank is safe.  
The computer screen shows a balloon at the center alongside a series of 
buttons: “Collect $$$” transferring all money to a permanent bank, “Pump 
up the balloon” to pump the balloon and earn money, “Total Earned” 
showing all money accumulated in the permanent bank, and “Last 
Balloon”, indicating money won with the last balloon (see Figure 1). The 
original version of the task comprises 90 trials with three different balloon 
types (i.e., blue, yellow, and orange), with each color having a different 
probability of explosion.  
In the version used in the present study, there were 30 balloons in total, 
presented in a randomly computer-generated order to each participant. 
Participants did not know at which point the balloons would burst. They 
were told that each balloon could explode at any time and that the balloon 
could burst after the first pump up to balloon covering the whole screen. 
Participants sat in front of the computer and are asked to wear headphones. 
Risk-taking is assessed as the mean average number of pumps on un-popped 
balloons with higher scores indicate greater risk-taking (Lejuez et al., 2002). 
 
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume [1987]; Italian 
translation by Cosenza, Matarazzo, Baldassarre, & Nigro [2014]). The 
SOGS is a 20-item self-report instrument where each response is 
dichotomous (yes/no) and assesses the frequency and the gravity of 
gambling problems. Items include “When you gamble, how often you go 
back another day to win back the money you lost?” and “Have people ever 
criticized your gambling?” The items are based on the DSM criteria for 
problem gambling (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). Individuals 
who score from 0-2 are classified as having no problems with gambling, 
whereas those who score from 3-4 are classified as at-risk gamblers, and 
those with a score of 5 or above are classified as problem gamblers. The 
SOGS in the present study was found to have a high internal consistency 
reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha=.93, 95% CI [.92, .94]). 
 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt [1995]; 
Italian BIS-11 validation by Fossati, Di Ceglie, Acquarini, & Barratt 
[2001]). The BIS-11 is a 30-item self-report questionnaire assessing trait 
impulsiveness in general, and three its dimensions in particular: attentional 
impulsivity, that is the inability to concentrate attention (e.g., “I am restless 
at the theater or lectures”), motor impulsivity, namely acting without 
thinking (e.g., “I act on the spur of the moment”), and nonplanning 
impulsivity, that is the lack of future thinking (e.g., “I am more interested in 
the present than the future”). Responses are provided using a 4-point Likert 
scale ranging from “rarely/never” to “almost always/always”. Higher scores 
on the instrument indicate higher levels of impulsivity. In the present study, 
internal consistency for the total scale (α= .79, 95% CI [.73, .84]) and for 
each scale was adequate in the present sample: attentional (α= .63, 95% CI 
[.51, .72]), motor (α= .72, 95% CI [.63, .79]), and nonplanning (α= .60, 95% 
CI [.47, .70]). 
 
Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC-14; Strathman, Gleicher, 
Boninger, & Edwards, 1994; Italian translation by Cosenza & Nigro, 2015). 
The CFC-14 is a valid and reliable self-report questionnaire that assesses the 
extent to which individuals focus on the future consequences of their current 
behavior (i.e., it assesses time perspective). The 14 items comprise two 
subscales: immediate (e.g., “I generally ignore warnings about possible 
future problems because I think the problems will be resolved before they 
reach crisis level”) and future (e.g., “I consider how things might be in the 
future, and try to influence those things with my day to day behaviour”), 
scored using a 7-point scale (from “extremely uncharacteristic” to 
“extremely characteristic”). Higher scores on the instrument indicate a 
greater tendency to consider future consequences. In the present study, 
Cronbach's alpha for the full scale was .75 (95% CI [.68, .82]) and .74, 
(95% CI [.66, .81]) for the immediate subscale, and .80 (95% CI [.73, .85]) 
for the future subscale.  
 
Monetary Choice Questionnaire (MCQ; Kirby & Maraković, 1996; Italian 
translation by Cosenza & Nigro, 2015). MCQ is a questionnaire that 
assesses delay discounting and comprises 27 questions (using a 
dichotomous ‘yes/no’ scale), each of which involves a choice between an 
immediate amount of money and a larger amount delivered after a delay 
(ranging from 7 to 186 days). For example, one question asks, “Would you 
prefer $14 today, or $25 in 19 days?” Depending on the type of reward, 
questions are divided into three categories (i.e., small, medium and large). 
The pattern of responses determines the degree to which participants 
discount delayed rewards, by estimating k values obtained at three 
magnitudes of rewards contained within the questionnaire (i.e., small, 
medium and large). Therefore, the items assess how much the amount of a 
postponed reward influences its perceived value. Following the example by 
Kirby & Marakovic (1996) and Kirby, Petry, & Bickel (1999), question 19 
required participants to choose between "$33 today" and "$80 in 14 
days." (in our version Euros). A discount rate of 0.10 indicates that the 
participant is indifferent between these two rewards. Therefore, if a 
participant chooses the immediate reward on this trial (“$33”), his discount 
rate is greater than 0.10. Question 4 required participant to choose between 
"$31 today" and "$85 in 7 days.". A discount rate of 0.25 indicates that the 
participant is indifferent between these two rewards. Therefore, if the same 
participant chooses the delayed reward on this trial, his discount rate is less 
than 0.25. The two trials together imply that this person has a discount rate 
between 0.10 and 0.25. The geometric mean of this interval (k = 0.16) is 
used to estimate the person’s k value. This procedure minimizes the number 
of choices that would be errors with respect to the assigned k value (Kirby, 
2009; p. 459). Higher k values reflect a preference for immediate rewards. 
In the present study, the monetary amounts were converted from U.S. 
dollars to Euros. Kuder-Richardson reliability for the total scale (KR-20= 
.89) and for each scale was adequate in the present sample: small k (KR-20= 
.70), medium k (KR-20= .71), and large k (KR-20= .73). 
 
Procedure 
The participants were told that they were participating in an anonymous 
study in which the associations between several factors and gambling 
behavior were being examined. Participants were tested individually in a 
quiet room in a single session. After obtaining signed informed consent, 
participants performed the computerized BART task. Following this, they 
completed the battery of questionnaires. At the end of the experimental 
session, in the debriefing, the real purpose of the research was revealed. 
Each participant was thanked for his participation without monetary 
rewards. They were also assured that data would be analyzed in aggregate 
form and that they could withdraw from the study whenever they wanted. 
To ensure the anonymity of the participants, there were all assigned a 
numeric code. Ethical approval for the study was granted by the research 
team’s university ethics committee. 
 
Statistical analyses 
Data were analyzed with the IBM Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences, version 20.0. The alpha significance level was set at .05.  
A univariate ANOVA with ‘group’ (problem gamblers vs. healthy controls) 
as the independent variable and the average number of pumps in the BART 
as the dependent variable was conducted with the purpose to testing risk-
taking differences between the two groups. 
Univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with impulsivity (BIS-11) and 
time perspective (CFC-14) as the dependent variables and ‘group’ (problem 
gamblers vs. healthy controls) as independent factor were used to verify 
whether these measures differed significantly between groups. Multivariate 
analyses of variance (MANOVA) with the ‘group’ (problem gamblers vs. 
healthy controls) as independent variable and subscale scores of BIS-11 and 
CFC-14 as dependent variables was conducted.  
In order to evaluate delay-discounting differences between HCs and PGs, a 
mixed (2 X 3) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with ‘group’ (problem 
gamblers vs. healthy controls) as the between-participants and the three 
different reward amount-based parameters (small, medium and large k) as 
the within-participants factor.  
Zero-order correlations were calculated to examine the relationship between 
SOGS, BIS-11, CFC-14, and MCQ scores.  
Finally, a logistic regression was run with ‘group’ (problem gamblers vs. 
healthy controls) as dependent variable and total scores of behavioral 
(BART, MCQ rates) and self-report measures (BIS-11, CFC-14) as 
predictors. 
 
Results 
The effects of risk taking propensity as a function of gambling behavior 
severity were examined using the BART computerized experimental task. 
Results indicated that the two groups differed in risk-taking behavior (Table 
1). PGs were more risk prone compared to HCs (see Figure 2).  
PGs scored significantly higher than HCs on general impulsiveness (BIS-
11), and specifically on attentional impulsiveness, motor impulsiveness, and 
non-planning impulsiveness scales (Table 1).  
The two groups differed on time perspective (CFC-14), with PGs reporting 
significantly high scores on its subscale: immediate, compared to HCs. 
Future subscale scores were no different between groups.  
Analysis of delay discounting rates revealed a main effect of group: 
pathological gamblers showed steeper delay discounting rates than non-
pathological gamblers. No ‘group X reward’ amount interaction was 
detected, F(2,105)= 0.15; p= .86, η²= .01) (see Figure 3).  
Correlational analysis (see Table 2) revealed associations between all of the 
measures and severity of gambling problems. Significant patterns of 
association were observed between impulsivity (BIS), risk proneness 
(BART), and orientation to the present (CFC-14). In contrast, delay 
discounting rate (average k) correlated only with the severity of gambling 
problems, whereas Medium k rate was associated with motor impulsiveness 
and non-planning impulsiveness (see Table 2).  
A logistic regression was also run in order to identify the predictor of 
severity of gambling problems. Total scores on the BIS-11 and CFC-14, the 
overall discounting rate (Average k), and the performance on the Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task were used as predictor variables. In the first step, 
impulsivity (BIS-11) significantly predicted problem gambling, χ2(1, n=108) 
=24.11, p<.001, with 27% of variance explained (Nagelkerke R
2
). In the 
second step, along with impulsivity, risk-taking (BART) was entered into 
the regression model, χ2(2, n=108) =29.53, p<.001 and added 5% of the 
variance to the model. The betas indicated that impulsivity and risk-taking 
predict problem gambling. The percentage of explained variance in the full 
model was 32%. The overall classification accuracy was 68%. The Table 3 
displays the standardized beta coefficients, Wald statistics and significance 
levels for the predictors included in the model.  
 
Discussion 
This study experimentally examined, for the first time, the difference 
between pathological gamblers and healthy controls in being risk prone on 
the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), a validated task that resembles 
the real-world risk (Lejuez et al., 2002). The study also investigated, all 
together, impulsivity, inability to tolerate delay in gratification and time 
orientation in a sample of pathological gamblers and healthy controls, 
exploring the links between these factors and pathological gambling.  
The results showed that, compared to healthy controls (HCs), pathological 
gamblers were more risk prone and reported higher scores than HCs on all 
measures tested (i.e., increased impulsivity, steeper discounting rates, more 
orientation to the present). Analyses revealed significantly strong 
correlations between impulsivity (BIS-11), orientation to the present (CFC-
14), and risk proneness (BART), whereas delay discounting (MCQ) was 
only associated with the severity of gambling problems. Moreover, all the 
measures were related to gambling severity. Finally, logistic regression 
analysis demonstrated that impulsivity, along with risk-taking, was a 
significant predictor of gambling severity.  
Pathological gamblers were found to pump up balloons significantly more 
times than controls, thus demonstrating high-risk proneness, in line with 
past research (e.g., Ladouceur et al., 1987). This result is interesting as 
regards not the generic risk-taking but specifically monetary choices. In 
fact, even if the potential monetary wins or losses in the Balloon Analogue 
Risk Task were fictitious, participants were asked to behave as if money 
were real. In literature, the validity of the BART in capturing risk-taking has 
been well demonstrated (e.g., Lejuez et al., 2002). 
In contrast with Reynolds et al. (2006), a relationship between impulsivity 
and risk-taking was observed. The contradictory nature of results of these 
two studies is probably due to the heterogeneity of the two samples. An 
interesting association between time perspective and risk proneness was 
found, indicating that individuals with a shorter time perspective and 
difficulty considering future acting, were more likely to engage in risky 
behavior.  
Consistent with previous research that, starting from the classification of 
gambling as “impulse control disorder” has revealed the strong relation 
between impulsivity and problem gambling, the present study confirmed 
that the level of impulsivity is higher in pathological gamblers compared to 
controls (e.g., MacKillop, Anderson, Castelda, Mattson, & Donovick, 
2006b; Michalczuk, Bowden-Jones, Verdejo-Garcia, & Clark, 2011). Even 
if, in this study, the direction of the relationship between impulsivity and 
problem gambling severity cannot be inferred, previous longitudinal studies 
suggest that impulsivity causes gambling (Auger, Lo, Cantinotti, & 
O'Loughlin, 2010; Pagani, Derevensky, & Japel, 2009; Shenassa, Paradis, 
Dolan, Wilhelm, & Buka, 2012; Vitaro et al., 1999). For instance, Shenassa 
et al. (2012) found that children that exhibit higher level of impulsivity have 
a greater risk for developing gambling problems during adulthood. 
In line with previous findings (Hodgins & Engel, 2002), pathological 
gamblers reported also a short temporal horizon, with orientation to the 
present and an inability to consider a long period of time into the future.  
The correlation between time perspective and the three dimensions of 
impulsivity (i.e., attentional, motor, and non-planning) indicated that 
individuals that are oriented to the present tend to act without thinking and 
tend to make rapid decisions without future planning. This result observed 
in pathological gamblers confirms and extends previous findings on 
convenience samples of undergraduate students (Baumann & Odum, 2012; 
Daugherty & Brase, 2010) and on problem gamblers screened with self-
report questionnaire (Toplak et al., 2007).  
Similarly to previous studies (Alessi & Petry, 2003; Dixon, Marley & 
Jacobs, 2003; Miedl et al., 2012; Kraplin et al., 2014), the steeper 
discounting rates found in pathological gamblers, compared to controls, 
indicated that people with a pathological involvement in gambling prefer 
immediate rewards, even if smaller, than delayed ones, showing the inability 
to tolerate delay in gratification.  
The association between the inability to tolerate delay and gambling 
severity, in contrast with past studies (Madden et al., 2009; Miedl et al., 
2012; Petry, 2001a; Petry, 2012; Wilde, Goudriaan, Sabbe, Hulstijn, & 
Dom, 2013) confirms the pattern observed in Alessi and Petry’s study 
(2003). Even if this study does not permit a comprehensive insight into the 
nature of this relationship, recent research on problem and non-problem 
gambling adolescents highlights that delay discounting is one of the 
strongest predictor of gambling problems (Cosenza & Nigro, 2015). 
Similarly, in substance abuse literature, several research studies have 
observed that abstinence is associated with a reduction of discounting rates 
(Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Bretteville-Jensen, 1999; Petry, 2001a). 
The observed (albeit relatively weak) association between delay 
discounting, motor, and non-planning impulsiveness, confirmed past studies 
(e.g., Baumann & Odum, 2012; Cosenza & Nigro, 2015; de Wit, Flory, 
Acheson, McCloskey, & Manuck, 2007) and indicates that delay 
discounting should probably be considered a feature of impulsivity. 
Finally, high impulsivity, shortened time perspective and risk-taking were 
correlated with the severity of gambling problems. 
The present study is not without its limitations. The main limitation was the 
use of self-report measures that are influenced by many biases including 
recall biases and social desirability biases. The lack of associations between 
time perspective and delay discounting, that was expected, represents 
another limitation of this study. The sample size was also small but, 
compared to other studies with an experimental component, the sample size 
was commensurate. Also, the number of pathological gamblers in the study 
was relatively large compared to other studies. For instance, most national 
prevalence studies with sample sizes of 7.000-10.000 participants only 
contain 50-70 problem gamblers when analysis is done comparing problem 
gamblers to non-problem gamblers (e.g., the British Gambling Prevalence 
surveys by Wardle et al. [2007; 2011]). Despite the limitation of self-report, 
the results of the present study demonstrate correlations among several 
impulsivity traits in healthy and pathological gamblers, supporting the 
hypothesis that delay discounting, risk proneness and time perspective are 
not only related to each other but are important factors in gambling disorder.  
The present study also underlines that impulsivity is a core feature of 
gambling and that all its correlates need to be taken into account for a wider 
and more comprehensive understanding of this aspect of the disorder. In 
summary, the present study confirms many previous findings in the 
literature, and demonstrates that gamblers tend to be impulsive, oriented to 
the present and that they prefer immediate gratification and show more 
pronounced risk proneness. Future studies should investigate other 
psychological factors involved in pathological gambling that may be a role 
in impulsive behavior, such as motivational factors such as craving.  
It would also be interesting to establish if the effects found in the present 
study are observable in the early stage of the onset of gambling problems, 
including adolescent populations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: a behavioral theory of impulsiveness and 
impulse control. Psychological Bulletin, 82, 463-496. 
Alessi, S. M., & Petry, N. M. (2003). Pathological gambling severity is associated 
with impulsivity in a delay discounting procedure. Behavioural 
Processes, 64, 345-354. 
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (4th ed. Text Revision). Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (5th ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric 
Publishing. 
Andrade, L. F., & Petry, N. M. (2012). Delay and probability discounting in 
pathological gamblers with and without a history of substance use problems. 
Psychopharmacology, 219, 491-499. 
Auger, N., Lo, E., Cantinotti, M., & O'Loughlin, J. (2010). Impulsivity and 
socio‐economic status interact to increase the risk of gambling onset among 
youth. Addiction, 105, 2176-2183. 
Baumann, A. A., & Odum, A. L. (2012). Impulsivity, risk taking, and timing. 
Behavioural Processes, 90, 408-414. 
Bechara, A. (2003). Risky business: emotion, decision-making, and addiction. 
Journal of Gambling Studies, 19, 23-51.  
Bickel, W. K., & Marsch, L. A. (2001). Toward a behavioral economic 
understanding of drug dependence: delay discounting processes. Addiction, 
96, 73-86. 
Bickel, W. K., Odum, A. L., & Madden, G. J. (1999). Impulsivity and cigarette 
smoking: delay discounting in current, never, and ex-smokers. 
Psychopharmacology, 146, 447-454. 
Bretteville-Jensen, A. L. (1999). Addiction and discounting. Journal of Health 
Economics, 18, 393-407. 
Brevers, D., Cleeremans, A., Verbruggen, F., Bechara, A., Kornreich, C., 
Verbanck, P., & Noël, X. (2012). Impulsive action but not impulsive choice 
determines problem gambling severity. PLoS ONE, 7(11): e50647. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050647 
Canale, N., Vieno, A., Griffiths, M.D., Rubaltelli, E., Santinello, M. (2015). How 
do impulsivity traits influence problem gambling through gambling 
motives? The role of perceived gambling risk/benefits. Psychology of 
Addictive Behaviors 29, 813-823. 
Cosenza, M., Matarazzo, O., Baldassarre, I., & Nigro, G. (2014). Deciding with 
(or without) the Future in Mind: Individual Differences in Decision-Making. 
InRecent Advances of Neural Network Models and Applications (pp. 435-
443). Springer International Publishing. 
Cosenza, M., & Nigro, G. (2015). Wagering the future: Cognitive distortions, 
impulsivity, delay discounting, and time perspective in adolescent gambling. 
Journal of Adolescence, 45, 56-66. 
Cyders, M. A., & Smith, G. T. (2008). Emotion-based dispositions to rash action: 
Positive and negative urgency. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 807-846. 
Daugherty, J. R., & Brase, G. L. (2010). Taking time to be healthy: Predicting 
health behaviors with delay discounting and time perspective. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 48(2), 202-207. 
de Wit, H. (2009). Impulsivity as a determinant and consequence of drug use: a 
review of underlying processes. Addiction Biology, 14, 22-31.  
de Wit, H., Flory, J. D., Acheson, A., McCloskey, M., & Manuck, S. B. (2007). 
IQ and nonplanning impulsivity are independently associated with delay 
discounting in middle-aged adults. Personality and Individual Differences, 
42, 111-121. 
Dixon, M. R., Jacobs, E. A., & Sanders, S. (2006). Contextual control of delay 
discounting by pathological gamblers. Journal of Applied Behavior 
Analysis, 39, 413-422. 
Dixon, M. R., Marley, J., & Jacobs, E. A. (2003). Delay discounting by 
pathological gamblers. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 36(4), 449-
458. 
Flory, J. D., Harvey, P. D., Mitropoulou, V., New, A. S., Silverman, J. M., Siever, 
L. J., & Manuck, S. B. (2006). Dispositional impulsivity in normal and 
abnormal samples. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 40, 438-447. 
Fossati, A., Di Ceglie, A., Acquarini, E., & Barratt, E. S. (2001). Psychometric 
properties of an Italian version of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale‐11 
(BIS‐11) in nonclinical subjects. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 57, 815-
828. 
Green, L., & Myerson, J. (2004). A discounting framework for choice with 
delayed and probabilistic rewards. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 769-816.  
Griffiths, M. (1993). Tolerance in gambling: An objective measure using the 
psychophysiological analysis of male fruit machine gamblers. Addictive 
Behaviors, 18, 365-372. 
Griffiths, M. D. (2004). Betting your life on it: Problem gambling has clear health 
related consequences. British Medical Journal, 329, 1055-1056. 
Griffiths, M. D.  (2005). A ‘components’ model of addiction within a 
biopsychosocial framework. Journal of Substance Use, 10, 191-197. 
Griffiths, M. D. & Smeaton, M. (2002). Withdrawal in pathological gamblers: A 
small qualitative study. Social Psychology Review, 4, 4-13. 
Griffiths, M. D., Wardle, J., Orford, J., Sproston, K. & Erens, B. (2010). 
Gambling, alcohol consumption, cigarette smoking and health: findings 
from the 2007 British Gambling Prevalence Survey. Addiction Research 
and Theory, 18, 208-223. 
Hodgins, D. C., & Engel, A. (2002). Future time perspective in pathological 
gamblers. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 190, 775-780. 
Kessler, R. C., Hwang, I., LaBrie, R., Petukhova, M., Sampson, N. A., Winters, 
K. C., & Shaffer, H. J. (2008). DSM-IV pathological gambling in the 
National Comorbidity Survey replication. Psychological Medicine, 38, 
1351-1360. 
Kirby, K. N. (2009). One-year temporal stability of delay-discount rates. 
Psychonomic bulletin & review, 16(3), 457-462. 
Kirby, K. N., & Maraković, N. N. (1996). Delay-discounting probabilistic 
rewards: Rates decrease as amounts increase. Psychonomic Bulletin and 
Review, 3, 100-104. 
Kirby, K. N., Petry, N. M., & Bickel, W. K. (1999). Heroin addicts have higher 
discount rates for delayed rewards than non-drug-using controls. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 128(1), 78-87. 
Kräplin, A., Dshemuchadse, M., Behrendt, S., Scherbaum, S., Goschke, T., & 
Bühringer, G. (2014). Dysfunctional decision-making in pathological 
gambling: pattern specificity and the role of impulsivity. Psychiatry 
Research, 215, 675-682. 
Ladouceur, R., Mayrand, M., & Tourigny, Y. (1987). Risk-taking behavior in 
gamblers and non-gamblers during prolonged exposure. Journal of 
Gambling Behavior, 3, 115-122. 
Lejuez, C. W., Read, J. P., Kahler, C. W., Richards, J. B., Ramsey, S. E., Stuart, 
G. L., ... & Brown, R. A. (2002). Evaluation of a behavioral measure of risk 
taking: the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, 8(2), 75-84.  
Lesieur, H. R., & Blume, S. B. (1987). The South Oaks Gambling Screen 
(SOGS): a new instrument for the identification of pathological 
gamblers. American Journal of Psychiatry, 144, 1184-1188. 
Lesieur, H. R., & Rosenthal, R. J. (1991). Pathological gambling: A review of the 
literature (prepared for the American Psychiatric Association task force on 
DSM-IV committee on disorders of impulse control not elsewhere 
classified). Journal of Gambling Studies, 7, 5-39.  
Lorains, F. K., Cowlishaw, S., & Thomas, S. A. (2011). Prevalence of comorbid 
disorders in problem and pathological gambling: systematic review and 
meta‐analysis of population surveys. Addiction, 106, 490-498. 
MacKillop, J., Anderson, E. J., Castelda, B. A., Mattson, R. E., & Donovick, P. J. 
(2006a). Convergent validity of measures of cognitive distortions, 
impulsivity, and time perspective with pathological gambling. Psychology 
of Addictive Behaviors, 20, 75. 
MacKillop, J., Anderson, E. J., Castelda, B. A., Mattson, R. E., & Donovick, P. J. 
(2006b). Divergent validity of measures of cognitive distortions, 
impulsivity, and time perspective in pathological gambling. Journal of 
Gambling Studies, 22, 339-354. 
MacKillop, J., Miller, J. D., Fortune, E., Maples, J., Lance, C. E., Campbell, W. 
K., & Goodie, A. S. (2014). Multidimensional examination of impulsivity in 
relation to disordered gambling. Experimental and Clinical 
Psychopharmacology, 22, 176. 
MacLaren, V. V., Fugelsang, J. A., Harrigan, K. A., & Dixon, M. J. (2012). 
Effects of impulsivity, reinforcement sensitivity, and cognitive style on 
pathological gambling symptoms among frequent slot machine players. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 52, 390-394. 
Madden, G. J., Petry, N. M., & Johnson, P. S. (2009). Pathological gamblers 
discount probabilistic rewards less steeply than matched controls. 
Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 17, 283-297.  
Martins, S. S., Tavares, H., da Silva Lobo, D. S., Galetti, A. M., & Gentil, V. 
(2004). Pathological gambling, gender, and risk-taking behaviors. Addictive 
Behaviors, 29, 1231-1235. 
Michalczuk, R., Bowden-Jones, H., Verdejo-Garcia, A., & Clark, L. (2011). 
Impulsivity and cognitive distortions in pathological gamblers attending the 
UK National Problem Gambling Clinic: A preliminary 
report.  Psychological Medicine, 41, 2625-2635. 
Miedl, S. F., Büchel, C., & Peters, J. (2014). Cue-induced craving increases 
impulsivity via changes in striatal value signals in problem 
gamblers. Journal of Neuroscience, 34, 4750-4755. 
Miedl, S. F., Peters, J., & Büchel, C. (2012). Altered neural reward 
representations in pathological gamblers revealed by delay and probability 
discounting. Archives of General Psychiatry, 69, 177-186.  
Pagani, L. S., Derevensky, J. L., & Japel, C. (2009). Predicting gambling behavior 
in sixth grade from kindergarten impulsivity: a tale of developmental 
continuity. Archives of pediatrics & adolescent medicine, 163, 238-243. 
Patton, J. H., Stanford, M. S., & Barratt, E. S. (1995). Factor structure of the 
Barratt impulsiveness scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 51, 768-74. 
Petry, N. M. (2012). Discounting of probabilistic rewards is associated with 
gambling abstinence in treatment-seeking pathological gamblers. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 121, 151-167. 
Petry, N. M. (2001a). Pathological gamblers, with and without substance abuse 
disorders, discount delayed rewards at high rates. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 110, 482-487. 
Petry, N. M. (2001b). Substance abuse, pathological gambling, and 
impulsiveness. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 63, 29-38. 
Petry, N. M., & Casarella, T. (1999). Excessive discounting of delayed rewards in 
substance abusers with gambling problems. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 
56, 25-32. 
Potenza, M. N. (2006). Should addictive disorders include non‐substance‐related 
conditions? Addiction, 101, 142-151. 
Potenza, M. N. (2001). The neurobiology of pathological gambling. Seminars in 
Clinical Neuropsychiatry, 6, 217-226. 
Rachlin, H., & Green, L. (1972). Commitment, choice and self‐control 1. Journal 
of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 17, 15-22. 
Ramirez, L. F., McCormick, R. A., Russo, A. M., & Taber, J. I. (1983). Patterns 
of substance abuse in pathological gamblers undergoing treatment. 
Addictive Behaviors, 8, 425-428. 
Reynolds, B., Ortengren, A., Richards, J. B., & de Wit, H. (2006). Dimensions of 
impulsive behavior: Personality and behavioral measures. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 40, 305-315. 
Shenassa, E. D., Paradis, A. D., Dolan, S. L., Wilhelm, C. S., & Buka, S. L. 
(2012). Childhood impulsive behavior and problem gambling by adulthood: 
A 30‐year prospective community‐based study. Addiction, 107, 160-168.  
Slutske, W. S., Caspi, A., Moffitt, T. E., & Poulton, R. (2005). Personality and 
problem gambling: A prospective study of a birth cohort of young adults. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 62, 769-775. 
Slutske, W. S., Eisen, S., True, W. R., Lyons, M. J., Goldberg, J., & Tsuang, M. 
(2000). Common genetic vulnerability for pathological gambling and 
alcohol dependence in men. Archives of General Psychiatry, 57, 666-673. 
Strathman, A., Gleicher, F., Boninger, D. S., & Edwards, C. S. (1994). The 
consideration of future consequences: Weighing immediate and distant 
outcomes of behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 
742-752. 
Swann, A. C., Bjork, J. M., Moeller, F. G., & Dougherty, D. M. (2002). Two 
models of impulsivity: relationship to personality traits and 
psychopathology. Biological Psychiatry, 51, 988-994. 
Tavares, H., Zilberman, M. L., Hodgins, D. C., & El‐Guebaly, N. (2005). 
Comparison of craving between pathological gamblers and alcoholics. 
Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 29, 1427-1431. 
Toplak, M. E., Liu, E., MacPherson, R., Toneatto, T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2007). 
The reasoning skills and thinking dispositions of problem gamblers: A 
dual‐process taxonomy. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 20, 103-
124. 
Vitaro, F., Arseneault, L., & Tremblay, R. E. (1999). Impulsivity predicts problem 
gambling in low SES adolescent males. Addiction, 94, 565-575. 
Wardle, H., Sproston, K., Orford, J., Erens, B., Griffiths, M. D., Constantine, R. & 
Pigott, S. (2007). The British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2007. London: 
The Stationery Office 
Wardle, H., Moody. A., Spence, S., Orford, J., Volberg, R., Jotangia, D., Griffiths, 
M. D., Hussey, D. & Dobbie, F. (2011).  British Gambling Prevalence 
Survey 2010. London: The Stationery Office. 
Whiteside, S. P., & Lynam, D. R. (2003). Understanding the role of impulsivity 
and externalizing psychopathology in alcohol abuse: application of the 
UPPS impulsive behavior scale. Experimental and Clinical 
Psychopharmacology, 11, 210-?? Page numbers missing 
Whiteside, S. P., Lynam, D. R., Miller, J. D., & Reynolds, S. K. (2005). 
Validation of the UPPS impulsive behaviour scale: a four‐factor model of 
impulsivity. European Journal of Personality, 19, 559-574. 
Wiehler, A., & Peters, J. (2015). Reward-based decision making in pathological 
gambling: the roles of risk and delay. Neuroscience Research, 90, 3-14. 
Wilde, B., Goudriaan, A., Sabbe, B., Hulstijn, W., & Dom, G. (2013). Relapse in 
pathological gamblers: a pilot study on the predictive value of different 
impulsivity measures. Journal of Behavioral Addictions, 2, 23-30. 
Wray, I., & Dickerson, M. G. (1981). Cessation of high frequency gambling and 
‘withdrawal’symptoms. British Journal of Addiction, 76, 401-405. 
  
Table 1. Means and standard deviations on the self-report measures for 
healthy controls (HC; n=54), and pathological gamblers (PG; n=54) 
 
 HC (N =54) PG (N =54)    
 M SD M SD F(1,106) p< η² 
BIS-IA 14.11 3.21 17.61 4.46 21.85 .001 .17 
BIS-IM 18.70 4.04 23.50 5.51 26.58 .001 .20 
BIS-INP 25.69 4.88 29.20 5.20 13.14 .001 .11 
BIS-11 58.50 10.35 70.31 13.25 26.66 .001 .20 
CFC-I 22.99 7.44 27.43 9.79 7.23 .01 .06 
CFC-F 30.46 8.23 27.83 10.17 2.18 ns  
CFC-14 4.53 0.80 4.03 1.05 8.08 .01 .07 
AVERAGE k 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 4.70 .05 .04 
BART 23.44 17.55 42.59 25.28 20.91 .001 .16 
 
BIS-IA: Attentional Impulsiveness scale of BIS-11; BIS-IM: Motor Impulsiveness scale of 
BIS-11; BIS-INP: Nonplanning Impulsiveness scale of BIS-11; BIS-11: Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale Total Score; CFC-I: Immediate scale of CFC-14; CFC-F: Future scale 
of CFC-14; CFC-14:Immediate scale of Consideration of future consequence Total scores; 
AVERAGE k: Average k value of the Monetary Choice Questionnaire; BART: Average 
number of pumps of unexploded balloons in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Pearson correlation coefficients of measures among 
pathological gamblers (n=54) and healthy controls (n = 54) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.SOGS 
 
-            
2.BIS-IA 
 
.46** -           
3.BIS-IM 
 
.48** .74** -          
4.BIS-INP 
 
.39** .60** .68** -         
5.BIS-11 
 
.50** .86** .92** .87** -        
6.CFC-I 
 
.25** .47** .47** .47** .53** -       
7.CFC-F 
 
-.13 -.28** -.38** -.40** -.41** -.09 -      
8.CFC-14 
 
-.26** -.51** -.58** -.59** -.64** -.72** .75** -     
9.Small k 
 
.20* .09 .16 .14 .15 .13 -.03 -.10 -    
10.Medium k 
 
.23* .07 .19* .21* .18 .08 -.14 -.15 .82** -   
11.Large k 
 
.19* .08 .17 .12 .14 .03 -.11 -.10 .79** .84** -  
12. Overall k 
 
.21* .07 .17 .14 .15 .05 -.11 -.11 .89** .95** .95** - 
13.BART .40** .50** .46** .44** .52** -.32** -.32** .43** .12 .15 .14 .15 
 
Note. SOGS: South Oaks Gambling Screen; BIS-IA: Attentional Impulsiveness scale of BIS-11; BIS-IM: Motor 
Impulsiveness scale of BIS-11; BIS-INP: Nonplanning Impulsiveness scale of BIS-11; BIS-11: Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale Total Score; CFC-I: Immediate scale of CFC-14; CFC-F: Future scale of CFC-14; CFC-
14:Immediate scale of Consideration of future consequence Total scores; Small k, Medium k, Large k: Small, 
medium and large hyperbolic discounting functions of Monetary Choice Questionnaire; Overall k: Mean k values 
of Monetary Choice Questionnaire; BART: Balloon Analogue Risk Task  
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Multivariate prediction of severity of gambling problems with a 
logistic regression model  
Predict Beta S.E. Wald 
statistic 
p 
value 
Step 1     
BIS-11 0.084 0.020 18.01 0.001 
Step 2     
BIS-11 0.064 0.022 8.63 0.003 
BART 0.026 0.012 5.03 0.025 
 
Note. BIS-11= Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; BART= Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 1. The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2. Mean number of pumps of the unexploded balloons in the BART 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Delay discounting parameters for pathological gamblers (n=54) and healthy 
controls (n=54). Data are separated into the three different reward amounts and 
average k value. 
 
